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2026-07-11

From Huawei 'Genius Youth' Interview Disaster at DeepSeek: Is the Company Walking a Crooked Path After Funding?

7/11/2026 3

       On the evening of July 6, a former Huawei “genius youth” posted online about his second-round interview at DeepSeek. The interviewer stared at his left monitor and said, “You’re copying code, right? If you can’t prove you’re not, the interview is over.” He felt publicly accused of cheating, walked out on the spot, and shared the story. It shot to the top of trending topics the next day. That same afternoon, a well-known investor jumped in and called him “the most untrustworthy founder I’ve ever met.” The former Huawei talent fired back overnight, saying the investor had only wired half the promised money and then stopped.

       Two shiny labels — “Huawei genius youth” and “idealistic, national-level AI model company DeepSeek” — crashed into each other and went viral. But the real story isn’t about who won the argument. It’s a mirror that shows what often happens when AI companies get big funding and try to scale fast: systems break, the wrong people get interviewed for the wrong roles, and everyone ends up frustrated. The core issue isn’t that one interviewer was rude. It’s that DeepSeek’s hiring process hasn’t kept up with its growth, and we keep treating both “genius” individuals and big-name companies as if they’re perfect.

1. What actually happened in that interview

       Li Bojie, born in 1992, is now chief scientist at a startup called Pine AI (he specifically clarified he is not a co-founder). He wanted to do research work at DeepSeek. Instead, the first two rounds were coding tests. When the interview finally happened, the interviewer was late and seemed uninterested in his actual research. The only question that kept coming up was “What engineering challenges have you solved?”

       The most explosive moment was the copying accusation. Because it was a remote interview, he had two monitors on his desk — a completely normal setup for programmers. The interviewer accused him of looking at the left screen to copy code and threatened to end the interview if he couldn’t prove otherwise. Li explained it was just dual monitors. The interviewer didn’t believe him and turned it into a cheating allegation.

       A lot of people’s first reaction was sympathy: even a Huawei genius youth gets treated this way, so how hard must it be for everyone else? But if you look closer, this isn’t mainly about one interviewer’s attitude. It’s about deeper problems in how DeepSeek is building its team right now.

2. Why live coding tests feel outdated

       These days, a lot of code is written with AI assistance. Asking someone to write large chunks of code from scratch on a blank screen, with no tools, has become less useful for judging real-world ability. Turning that directly into a “you’re cheating” accusation makes it worse.

       This kind of mismatch has happened before. In older programming interviews, candidates were sometimes asked to hand-write a keyword that the development environment automatically generates. People who actually wrote code every day never typed it manually, so the test ended up measuring the wrong thing. In the AI era, clinging to old “prove you can code blind” methods often misses the point and can unfairly penalize strong candidates.

3. When interviewers skip the resume, bigger problems follow

       In normal hiring, you read someone’s background first, then talk about what they’ve done and whether it fits the role. In this case, the interviewer clearly hadn’t looked at Li Bojie’s resume. His history as one of the first eight Huawei genius youths, his top-conference papers, his training at a top university — none of it seemed to matter. He was just another person going through the same standardized process.

       Other candidates have reported the same pattern at DeepSeek: multiple HR people adding them on WeChat at once, interviewers arriving late and acting impatient, and questions that have nothing to do with the candidate’s actual experience. When hiring turns into “run everyone through the same script,” you waste time and often end up with poor matches.

4. The “Huawei genius youth” label cuts both ways

       The program started in 2019 when Huawei’s founder personally pushed for it. It offered very high salaries — up to around 200 million RMB a year for the top tier — to attract exceptional young talent. Li Bojie was in that first group of eight. He later left Huawei reportedly turning down a 3 million RMB annual package.

       But a flashy label only proves one thing: strong research ability. It doesn’t automatically mean someone is also great at engineering execution, leading teams, or running a company as CEO. Some former genius youths have stayed and contributed quietly inside big organizations. Others left to chase bigger dreams. The public tends to notice the dramatic exits more than the steady work happening behind the scenes. Treating the label as proof of overall perfection sets everyone up for disappointment.

5. Research and engineering are very different jobs

       Li Bojie wanted a research role. The interview kept pushing toward engineering tasks. This is a common mismatch.

       Think of it this way: research is like working in a lab — exploring new methods, running experiments, publishing papers, and focusing on “can we make this work at all?” Engineering is like running a restaurant that serves customers every day — the food has to be consistent across different kitchens, handle rush hours, fix problems quickly, and keep customers happy long-term. The skills don’t overlap as much as people assume. Code written for a research paper can “run” in a demo, but it often falls apart when you try to make it stable for real users. Putting pure research talent into an engineering-heavy interview without understanding this difference leads to exactly the frustration we saw here.

6. The investment side showed another expectation mismatch

       On the same day, a different story broke. An investor (co-founder of Huobi) publicly accused Li Bojie of taking funding for a project called Metagent and then going silent — not sharing updates or financials. Li replied that the investor had promised $1.5 million but only sent $500,000 and then stopped.

       Both sides seem to have had unrealistic expectations. Investors who back young research stars know the risk is high: great at papers doesn’t automatically mean great at being a CEO or handling investor communications. Smart investors usually release money in stages — give some upfront, then more after clear milestones and transparency. This is called milestone-based funding. It protects the investor while giving the founder a chance to prove progress.

       Li apparently felt the full amount was promised and got frustrated when it didn’t arrive. The investor felt the founder wasn’t communicating properly and chose to limit further risk. Neither side had aligned expectations or built enough trust. The result was public finger-pointing instead of a productive relationship.

7. Why he actually wanted to join DeepSeek

       Li later posted a video clarifying his situation. His current company is running fine — he wasn’t job-hunting because of failure. He wanted to join DeepSeek because almost everyone is now building “harness agents” (AI systems that can use tools, write code, and handle complex tasks on top of large models). Many of the most useful capabilities, however, are locked inside the model companies: how they build training data, how they evaluate performance, and the long system prompts that guide behavior.

       He wanted to go inside and see how things actually work. This isn’t unusual. Even high-profile people in Silicon Valley have left startups to join base model companies just to understand the foundations better. Without an easy external collaboration path at DeepSeek, he tried the normal job route — and ran straight into the hiring issues described above.

8. What happens when a company rushes hiring after funding

       DeepSeek completed its first external funding round on June 16. After that, it clearly wanted to quickly build its own harness agent capabilities. The normal way to grow a new team is to first design the structure, identify the right experienced people, and let them help build the rest of the team layer by layer. Instead, it appears they went straight to headhunters for stacks of resumes and ran everyone through a fast, uniform interview process.

       This “get it done quickly” approach often backfires. You can end up with mismatched roles, interviewers who don’t understand the work, and a team that looks busy but struggles to deliver real results. A famous earlier example is what happened at JD.com during one of its fast-growth periods. They hired a lot of “good enough for now” people to keep the website running. It worked short-term, but later, when they needed to level up and bring in stronger talent, many key positions were already occupied by people who couldn’t handle the next stage. The company had to spend years fixing the gaps.

       DeepSeek risks repeating a version of this story if it keeps prioritizing speed over thoughtful team building.

9. A few final thoughts

This whole episode really comes down to three simple reminders:

  • Don’t treat job titles or company names as proof of overall perfection.
  • They only show strength in one area. Don’t imagine companies like Huawei or DeepSeek as single, flawless personalities. Every organization has strong parts and weaker parts.
  • Nothing in the real world is perfect. Even the most impressive systems have rough edges and rough periods.

       DeepSeek has the money now. Whether it builds a strong team or ends up carrying hidden problems forward depends on how it handles hiring and role matching in the next phase. The world is basically one big makeshift team — some groups know they’re still figuring things out and keep improving, while others act like they’ve already built a perfect temple. The first kind usually travels farther.

2026-06-21

DeepSeek Secures ¥51B Financing——Who Put Up the Money, How It’s Spent, and Who Calls the Shots

6/21/2026 0


DeepSeek just closed a 51 billion RMB (~$7.4 billion) round — the largest single financing ever for a Chinese AI company, and its very first round. Naturally, it drew a lot of attention.

Compared with the U.S., the gap is still wide. Anthropic has raised about $116.3 billion cumulatively, OpenAI around $150 billion. DeepSeek’s round is roughly 1/15.7 of Anthropic’s and 1/20 of OpenAI’s. In China, however, this is the biggest single round on record.

Chinese AI companies enjoy lower labor and power costs, so they simply don’t need to burn as much cash. That explains part of the difference.

1. Investor Lineup: Liang Wenfeng Leads with 20 Billion RMB

The money came from ten parties:

  • Liang Wenfeng: 20 billion RMB (largest single check)
  • Tencent: 10 billion
  • CATL-affiliated fund: 5 billion
  • NetEase and JD: 3 billion each
  • Legend Capital and IDG: 3 billion each
  • Zhengxin Valley and Shixiang Tech: 1.5 billion each
  • National AI Industry Investment Fund: 980 million

Total ≈ 50.98 billion RMB. As lead investor, Liang secured pricing rights and the ability to set the main terms. Others who wanted in had to accept the framework he put forward.

2. Key Deal Terms: How Limited Partnership Locks in Control

Instead of direct equity into DeepSeek, the round used a limited partnership structure with GP (general partner) and LP (limited partners).

Liang Wenfeng is the GP; everyone else (Tencent, CATL system, JD, etc.) are LPs. LPs can review financials but have no voting rights or say on strategy, suppliers, or major decisions. For example, CATL couldn’t insist DeepSeek use its batteries, and Tencent couldn’t force DeepSeek to rent its cloud — they’d first have to convince the GP.

This concentrates decision-making power with Liang.

A second term is a 5-year lock-up: LPs cannot exit early. Standard exit routes include IPO, acquisition, or negotiated extension/rollover/impairment at the end. Funds legally cannot guarantee “no losses,” so everyone understands the risks.

Third, LP qualification review. DeepSeek wants to hold its own licenses (ICP, ISP, etc.) as a pure domestic entity. Any foreign capital, even 1%, could complicate things. Screening LPs upfront avoids future headaches and smooths the path for a potential A-share listing.

Fourth, a no-poaching clause: investors cannot hire away DeepSeek employees. Tencent and JD are both building their own large models, yet they agreed not to recruit from DeepSeek after signing. The absence of Alibaba, Xiaomi, and ByteDance from the list may be related.

3. The National AI Fund’s Special Role

The National AI Industry Investment Fund stands out. It contributed only 980 million RMB but invested directly into DeepSeek (not as an LP), giving it board seats and veto rights over new financing, IPO/bankruptcy/liquidation, charter amendments, major asset deals, and more.

This is not the well-known big semiconductor fund. It’s a new AI-focused fund established in January 2025 (≈60 billion RMB scale). Its involvement provides both regulatory support and a clearer route to A-share listing — which is why other LPs were willing to accept stricter terms.

4. Where the Money Goes: Compute, Team, and Commercialization

The capital is earmarked for three interconnected priorities:

  • Inner Mongolia compute center — Located in Ulanqab (one of the “East Data West Computing” hubs) where electricity costs less than 0.3 RMB/kWh. DeepSeek is already hiring senior data-center operations engineers at ~30k RMB/month + 14 months.
  • Harness Agent team — To be built starting May 2026, focusing on inference systems.
  • Commercialization — The model is open-source under MIT license, so anyone can deploy it for free. DeepSeek’s edge will come from running the lowest-cost, highest-efficiency inference itself. The plan is to let others deploy through DeepSeek’s infrastructure (a bit like a 4S dealership model: the brand sets standards and pricing, partners handle sales and share revenue). Tencent Cloud has reportedly leaned toward this approach.

5. Why All RMB? A Direct Path to A-Share Listing

The entire round was done in RMB with domestic entities. The goal is twofold: stay fully domestic to secure licenses easily, and prepare for an A-share IPO.

Many other Chinese AI firms raised in USD for higher valuations but face Hong Kong or overseas exit routes. DeepSeek’s RMB + national fund route prioritizes A-share certainty. A-shares offer deeper liquidity and scarcity value (still partially approval-based), making exits more attractive for investors.

6. “Circumstances Trump Individuals”: Who Actually Sets the Rules

Some commentary frames this as “Liang Wenfeng outsmarted capital.” A more accurate view is that circumstances favored the founder. When a company has a credible A-share path, national-fund backing, and a lead investor willing to write the largest check, investors are more willing to accept GP-led structures, lock-ups, and no-poaching terms.

7. Bottom Line: Funding Is Done — Rhythm Matters Most

DeepSeek has always been low-key and execution-focused. With this capital in hand, if it continues at its own steady pace on technology and commercialization — rather than rushing into heavy PR and frequent launches — the round should prove genuinely helpful.

The national fund brings resources and listing support, along with a degree of oversight. Overall, the structure gives the founding team meaningful control while giving capital a clear path to returns. DeepSeek’s next chapters are still worth watching.